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ABSTRACT
Ten years have passed since the Swedish government widely encouraged its municipalities to
marketize their elderly care services. There has been a long-standing discussion on the benefit
of marketization during that period, but most of the discussions were developed from the case
studies of a limited number of municipalities. With lately available statistics, the present study
tries to find some general rules across many different municipalities. Regarding the motives of
the municipalities for marketization of elderly care, there is apparently a tendency that
municipalities with stronger bourgeois ideology, more serious shortage of care supply, larger
size of caretakers and higher population density are more likely to rely on privately managed
service. As for the effect of marketization, it is shown that the cost performance is better in
those municipalities allowing the participation of private providers than in other municipalities.
However, this effect seems to have significant negative association with the strength of
bourgeois ideology. This implies that the municipalities with strong bourgeois ideology tend to
consider marketization as a purpose by itself rather than a means to achieve better cost
performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sweden had long been reputed as a ￿public service state￿ along with other Nordic states.
Generally speaking, the state is more heavily engaged in the organization and financing of
social services under more generous and socially redistributive schemes than other developed
countries (Ervik and Kuhnle 1996; Lehto, Moss and Rostgaard 1999). Consequently, the share
of the public sector in total employment was as much as 31.7% in 1990 (Rosen 1997). In the
same year, the proportion of total government expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) was
59.1%, which was over 20 point higher than the average of OECD countries (Norrman and
McLure Jr. 1997). The amount of public social expenditure was as high as 32% of GDP in as
early as 1990, which was far greater than the corresponding figures of other European Union
members (23% on average), Japan (11%) and the United States (14%).
While generous public financing was largely preserved, the management of social services
became more and more open to the private sector during the 1990s. The share of contract-based
activities in total social services reached 10% in 1998 and continued to increase in the following
year (Svenska Kommunf￿rbundet
  2001a: 11). However, it is true that this so-called
￿marketization￿ does not mean the total disengagement of the public sector. It may be fair to say
that marketization ideas ￿never achieved the penetration which they enjoyed in Australia during
the 1990s or New Zealand and the UK during the 1980s￿ (Pollit and Bouckaert 2000: 262).
After all, public providers are still active in parallel with private ones, and the change occurs at
the level of local authorities (municipalities) and not of the whole state.
Nevertheless, the recent spread of marketization is far from negligible. In the field of elderly
care, the market-oriented reform was accelerated after the large-scale reform of the elderly care
system called ￿˜delreformen￿ in 1992. The aim of the reform was to integrate the function of
elderly care under the municipal responsibility, and not to promote marketization. Yet the
transformation of the existing framework gave many municipalities an opportunity to carry out
the marketization reform. Once municipalities have decided to carry out systematic changes,3
they are able to do so, now that the new scheme provided them with an integrated responsibility
for elderly case. Accordingly the share of private service in terms of the cost (including the care
for the handicapped as well as for the elderly) grew from around 1% in 1991 to 8.0% in 2001
(Lefwerth and Nordstr￿m 1992; Svenska kommunf￿rbundent and Statistiska Centralbyr￿n
2002). In 2001, almost a half (49.5%) of the municipalities are dependent on some sort of
private caregivers for home help service and/ or special housing accommodation. The shares of
the elderly receiving private home help service and special housing were 7.8% and 12.4%
respectively (Table 1).







1998 - a) 9.8 b)
1999 6.0 9.7 c)
2000 7.3 11.6 d)
2001 7.8 12.4
Home help service Special housing accommodation
Note: a) Information is missing. b) The survey date is changed from 31 December to 1
November. So-called ￿occasional￿ and ￿part-time￿ residences (avl￿snings- och
v￿xelv￿rdsplatser) are not included. c) Permanent residents on 1 November and Short-
term residents in November. d) The survey data is changed from 1 November to 1
October. Both permanent and short-term residents are referred.
Source: Socialstyrelsen (2001); Socialstyrelsen (2002)
The spread of marketization is followed by many remarkable studies of this phenomenon.4
With only few exceptions
1, however, previous studies focused on one or few particular cases,
presumably for lack of official comprehensive statistics about the activities and finances
exclusively for elderly care. All case studies have important implications, but they are not
independent of the particularities of the municipalities/ municipality districts they observed. In
addition, there is virtually no literature in English on this subject.
Yet the availability of relevant official data has been improved in the last few years, even
though it is not abundant yet. By use of those data, the present study aims to discuss the general
trend and effect of the marketization reform across all municipalities in Sweden, as far as the
data availability permits.
The following part discusses the motives and effects of the marketization of Swedish elderly
care. Three hypotheses are presented in the second section, and those hypotheses are tested by
the model analysis in the third section. This is followed by some conclusions in the final
section.
2. MARKETIZATION OF ELDERY CARE: MOTIVES AND EFFECTS
Motives for marketization
As noted above, not all municipalities are active in marketization. While nearly a half of
Swedish municipalities adopt private providers to their elderly care services, the majority do
not. This leads to the question of what type of municipality applies the marketization scheme
more willingly than others.
When asked about the motive for marketization of elderly care services, almost all municipal
officials and politicians interviewed by the author mentioned the improvement of the quality of
their services as the primary goal. However, this does not mean that those municipalities not
                                                     
1 Recognizing the prevalence of case-oriented studies, F￿lster (1993) conducted an analysis based on the
database that included 60 reform cases and 36 non-reform cases. However, he did not specify
municipalities/ municipality districts he selected, nor did he indicate the criteria of his selection.5
marketizing their services are indifferent toward the quality of their services. Therefore the
question is why certain municipalities are motivated to choose marketization in order to
improve the quality of their services.
One of the most plausible explanations is political ideology (Socialstyrelsen 2000a: 9).
Marketization of social services has been advocated most by the ￿bourgeois￿ parties, especially
the Moderate Party. In fact, when they formed a right-block coalition from 1991 to 1994, the
government organized the Competition Committee (KonkurrenskommittØn) to promote
marketization of various municipal works. With the emphasis on market competition and
efficiency, they criticized the traditional public monopoly over social services. The Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and other left-side parties, by contrast, tend to stress the danger of
leaving social services to private caregivers, especially profit-driven companies. Although they
get more and more positive about market competition, they are generally more cautious about
the introduction of market competition into social services, believing that it may harm stable
service provision. It may also be argued that the politicians in the left block is more reluctant for
marketization than their oppositions, as it may well destabilize the working status of municipal
workers, who are heretofore among the most important voters for them.
The share of elderly population in the society may also affect political choice. An opinion
poll shows that elderly people are not generally concerned about the difference between public
and private management, but some interviewees suggest that elderly people would be upset by
the replacement of the staff, or the change of the care program. Since the introduction of private
providers can potentially cause those changes, politicians may be more cautious in
marketization when they have more elderly residents (i.e. voters) in their municipalities.
Conversely, it is expected that municipalities with less elderly population may become more
active in introducing the marketization reform. However, it may also be said that municipalities
with more elderly population are more interested in marketization, since they are more likely to
suffer from the financial problem and more willing to lower the costs. Hence the prediction of6
the effect of this factor is ambivalent.
Another factor that may affect the motive of municipalities for marketization is the short
supply of care. As a result of generous welfare system, Swedish municipalities often suffer from
financial problem. The aging of the society has multiplied the problem both by increasing the
number of caretakers and by decreasing the number of taxpayers. Consequently, few
municipalities seem to be offering a sufficient amount of care, particularly with regard to special
housing accommodation. Around 8% of the people over 65 years old are living in special
housing accommodation right now, but this does not mean that all of the remaining 92% are
happy to stay at home. In fact, nearly 5,000 people stood in the queue to get a place in special
housing accommodation in 2000 (Dagens Nyheter 9 February 2001). Municipalities need to
lower the cost per unit in order to increase the number of units, unless they can expect a large
growth of budget income. Marketization is often discussed in that context, since it is supposedly
helpful for cost reduction.
Besides the motives shown above, the choice of municipalities also depends on the technical
feasibility of marketization. The size of caretakers may be important in this respect. Obviously,
it is easy to create a share for private providers when there are a large number of caretakers.
Conversely, if there are only a few special housing accommodations, it may be extremely
controversial to privatize one of them. Home help services and other types of care for the
elderly at home also need certain size of unit scale, and it is difficult, and perhaps economically
unreasonable, to divide a small amount of work into municipal and private parts. Moreover, if
the size of caretakers is small, the size of the municipal administration is small, too. It is then
difficult to divide the administration staff between those in charge of the selection of private
providers and those in charge of the management of municipal care to prepare for marketization.
Even though marketization is administratively possible, private providers may not be interested
to enter into the market if there is no economy of scale.
Private providers may also be reluctant to enter into the municipalities with sparse7
population. After all, it is more costly if caretakers and their accommodations are spread
geographically. It may also be more difficult to find human resources to be employed in sparsely
populated regions. In general, recruitment in the welfare sector is a problem in many
municipalities. According to the survey of Socialstyrelsen (the National Board of Heath and
Welfare) in 2000, for example, over 80% of the interviewed municipalities felt that the
recruitment of nurses was either ￿much difficult￿ or ￿quite difficult￿ (Socialstyrelsen 2000b).
From the viewpoint of recruitment, the relative size of elderly population may also be
significant, but again, the effect may be ambivalent. For private providers, they may be more
reluctant to enter into the municipalities where young human resources are more difficult to
find. For municipalities, on the other hand, they may have more interest to rely on private
providers when it is more difficult to recruit care workers on their own.
To summarize, the above arguments are formulized into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Municipalities with stronger bourgeois ideology, more serious shortage of care
supply, larger size of caretakers and higher population density are more likely to
adopt private providers for elderly care services than others, while the effect of
the relative size of elderly population is ambivalent.
There has been a study that examines the association between several explanatory factors
and the attitude of municipalities toward marketization for elderly care services (Trydeg￿rd
2001). However, the study did not only deal with elderly care but also other welfare services,
and the explanatory factors applied to the model are not tailored specifically for elderly care. Its
analysis indicated that the share of private elderly care services, in terms of the number of
private employees, has a strong positive association with the share of the votes for the Moderate
Party, a moderate positive association with the whole population, a strong negative association
with the share of lower-educated people in the population as well as a weak negative association8
with the general service level of the municipality (Ibid.: 120). Presumably, the size of the whole
population might be related with the size of the caretakers. The share of lower-educated people
and the share of elderly population might correlate with each other. The general service level
might reflect the supply-demand balance of elderly care. In any case, however, the study does
not articulate why those variables are incorporated into the model, nor does it interpret the result
of the estimation. Therefore it is still worthwhile to conduct an analysis with a set of the
explanatory variables indicated in the hypothesis.
Effects of marketization
The effects of marketization of elderly care services has been one of the most controversial
issues in Sweden during the 1990s. The main question in earlier discussions was whether
private providers perform more effectively than municipal ones. Various studies were
conducted, and their conclusions were diverse. According to the literature review by
Socialstyrelsen (the National Board of Heath and Welfare) in 1996 (Socialstyrelsen 1996), the
answer of this question is twofold. First, contract-based providers were on average less costly
than municipal ones. Second, it is not very clear whether contract-based services provided better
quality than municipal services.
The first point is not very surprising. This is not because private management is superior to
public management, but rather because private providers could not enter into the market without
cost advantage in many cases. As newcomers, they were (or were regarded as, at least) less
competitive in terms of their knowledge about services and customers. They could argue that
they would offer better services, but it was very difficult to replace incumbent municipal
providers without appealing their cost advantage. It should also be remembered that private
providers often fail even though they offer lower prices, since the selection of providers has
rarely been decided by genuine price auction. For their success, private providers should often
offer prices significantly lower than their municipal rivals.9
Against this background, the second point is also quite understandable. Even though private
providers made efforts to be more cost-effective, they were often constrained by strict financial
conditions from the beginning. Furthermore, it should be noted that the replacement of
management does not necessarily mean the replacement of the staff, especially those working
on site. If a private company acquires the management of services from a municipality, it is
obliged to employ the staff that has been employed by the municipality by that time
2. In other
words, there is no difference between municipal and private management from caretakers￿ point
of view. Most of the staffs are the same, even if their employer is replaced. Of course, the
placement of the staff often changes under the new management, but this may cause a rather
negative effect on the quality evaluation by caretakers. Since caretakers￿ needs are very diverse,
it takes much time for new caregivers to adapt themselves to those needs. While caretakers often
appreciate new practices brought from new providers, those schemes did not always compensate
for the breakdown of traditional personal continuities.
While the debate on those points has long continued, the public-private dichotomous
comparison seems to have become less important. After all, the entry of private providers seems
to have changed the management of municipal providers. After observing six municipalities
with relatively long history of marketization, Svensson and Edebalk (2001) remarked that ￿there
is no clear difference between a private and a municipal provider with regard to the working
manner￿ (p.33).
Presumably, the exposure of market competition has given municipal employees a good
incentive to improve their services. It is true that their working status will be preserved even if
they are taken over by private owners as stated above, but they are usually reluctant to leave the
current status due to uncertainty under a new regime. Therefore it is not surprising that
municipal managers are encouraged to learn new practices from private providers to improve
their competitive advantage, just as private companies are engaged in ￿competitor analysis￿
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(Porter 1980). It may also be important that the recurrent process of provider selection (i.e.
bidding) provides a more effective monitoring than before. Even though municipal providers are
allowed to continue their services, the performance of their services is now regularly compared
with that of private providers. According to Svensson and Edebalk (2001: 34-5), furthermore,
several municipal providers refer to the prices submitted by private ones as the benchmark with
which they reflect upon their own prices. Provided that private providers mostly offer lower
prices in order to win the bid, their price proposals are very likely to exert downward pressure
on municipal prices. In this way, the trend of incrementally growing prices is punctuated and the
price level is lowered at the time of bidding. With this model, Svensson and Edebalk showed
how the growth of the whole municipal costs for elderly care services had been moderated by
the participation of private providers.
However, previous studies mostly developed their discussions from time-series observation
of some particular municipalities. Yet cross-sectional observation may also help us understand
the influence of the participation of private providers over the cost performance of
municipalities.
The cost performance of municipal providers may also be affected by the political situation.
It is reasonable to assume that municipal providers make more effort to cut the costs when they
feel more pressure from politics. When a municipality has strong bourgeois ideology, its public
care providers may be more conscious of the possibility of being replaced with private
providers. Private providers may also be more concerned about the cost performance when they
make a proposal to bourgeois municipalities. From those arguments, it follows that the cost
performance is better in the municipalities with strong bourgeois ideology.
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether bourgeois municipalities are more concerned about the
cost. Since bourgeois politicians often regard marketization as ideologically important, they
may adopt private providers more easily, i.e. with little economic consideration. In that case,
private providers are less encouraged to cut costs. Municipal providers may also be discouraged11
from cost-cutting effort if marketization is introduced in any case. If this is the case, a
completely opposite idea comes up: marketization is less effective in the municipalities with
strong bourgeois ideology. Like the share of elderly population in Hypothesis 1, the role of the
political variable is inconclusive, and should be tested. The hypothesis is therefore specified as
follows:
Hypothesis  2: The cost performance of elderly care is better in municipalities where
marketization is introduced. The municipal political situation may affect the
cost effect of marketization, although the influence may be either positive or
negative.
The validity of the two hypotheses presented above is tested with the analysis of the
empirical data in the next section.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data and method
As already mentioned, it has been very difficult to obtain the empirical data of the elderly care
services in Sweden. This is largely because of highly advanced decentralization ￿ even the
central government seems to have difficulty in collecting information from all municipalities.
Table 1 above is a typical case in point ￿ the survey method has not been historically consistent,
nor the data set is complete - the figure for the home service is missing in 1998, for example.
What is more, the financial data exclusively for elderly care services had not been available for
a long time. The figures included the cost for the care of handicapped people, which constitutes
a considerable part of the total cost.
Nonetheless, the availability of the data has improved in recent years. Since the data of 1999,
the financial data for the elderly have been published separately. The costs for the care of the12
elderly living in ordinary houses and the care of the elderly living in special housing
accommodations are now distinguished.
It is true that the data are still too aggregate to conduct close cost analysis. With regard to the
care of the elderly living in ordinary houses, for instance, the care includes various home help
services such as cleaning and doing laundry, help with shopping and preparation of meals, as
well as short-term special accommodations. Furthermore, around a half of municipalities
provide home nursing care service under this framework. Despite that variety, we could only
obtain the financial data accommodating all services.
With the available data, however, it is still possible to manage some empirical analysis, even
though the estimation is nothing more than a very rough sketch. In order to establish the
hypotheses in the last section, we construct two multiple regression models, one for the motives
for marketization (Model 1) and the other for the cost effect of marketization (Model 2).
Model construction and estimation - Model 1
In order to establish the first hypothesis, the dependent variable of the model should be an index
of the share of private providers. The care of the elderly in ordinary housing varies in duration
and type, and it is difficult to define the aggregate share of private providers. On the other hand,
the care of the elderly in special housing accommodations is more homogeneous, and it is less
problematic to define the share of the residents of privately managed accommodations as the
share of private providers. The study therefore focuses on the care in special housing
accommodations. Accordingly, the model is specified as follows:
PVSHARE = a1 + a2 (BGSHARE) + a3 (BGDUMMY) + a4 (CARERATIO)
 + a5 (CARENUM) + a6 (POPDEN) + a7 (ELDSHARE) + error terms (1)
PVSHARE  = the share of the residents of privately managed accommodations in the13
total number of caretakers
BGSHARE  = the share of politicians of the bourgeois parties (Moderate Party, Centre
Party, Liberal Party and Christian Democrats) in the municipality council
BGDUMMY  = 1 where the bourgeois parties occupy the majority in the municipality
council; 0 otherwise
CARERATIO = the ratio of the elderly population to the number of the caretakers = the
number of elderly people per a place in special housing accommodation
CARENUM = the number of the caretakers in special housing accommodation
(converted to the natural logarithm)
POPDEN = population density
ELDSHARE = the share of the elderly (defined as 65 and over) in the total population of
a municipality
A complete set of the above variables is available for all 289 municipalities. The data of the
political representation, the number of caretakers and the demographic structure are drawn from
Valmyndigheten (the Election Authority), Socialsstyrelsen (the National Board of Health and
Welfare) and Statistiska Centralbyr￿n (Statistics Sweden) respectively. For the political variable,
a dummy variable is applied besides the crude share of bourgeois councilors, with the idea that
the majority may mark an additional impact for political decision-making. The number of the
caretakers in special housing accommodation is converted to the natural logarithm
(CARENUM), because the distribution of the crude data is skewed too much.
The coefficients for BGSHARE (a2), BGDUMMY (a3), CARERATIO (a4), CARENUM (a5)
and POPDEN (a6) are expected to be positive according to Hypothesis 1, as it holds a larger
share of private providers in the municipalities with stronger bourgeois ideology, more serious
shortage of care supply, larger size of caretakers and higher population density. Since the effect
of the relative size of elderly population is ambivalent, the coefficient for ELDSHARE (a7) may14
be either positive or negative, or its contribution may be just insignificant. Table 2 shows the
estimates of the model.















Number of cases 289
Model 1
Note: t-Statistics in parenthesis; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***) level.
The significant positive contribution of BGSHARE is consistent with the hypothesis
regarding the political influence on marketization. However, the model fails to show the
significance of political majority. This seems to reflect the general characteristic of Swedish
municipal councils, which is rather consensual than majority-dictatorial.
The result is consistent with the hypothesis for the variables CARERATIO, CARENUM and
POPDEN, all of which show significant positive contribution to the share of private providers.
Moreover, the share of the elderly in the total population, ELDSHARE, indicates no
significance, which supports the idea that the contribution of the variable is ambivalent.
Model construction and estimation - Model 2
The second model concerns the effect of marketization. Due to the variety of the elderly care in
ordinary houses, the following model focuses on the care in special housing accommodations,
as the first model. The unit cost of special housing accommodations (i.e. the cost per resident)
may still vary depending on the conditions of the residents, but the variation is presumably15
much smaller than the unit cost of the care in ordinary houses. The care in ordinary houses
encompasses short-term special accommodations and home nursing care as well as home help
services, and it is meaningless to discuss its aggregate unit cost, unless the data are classified
into those types.
In the second model, therefore, the unit cost for the care in special housing accommodations
is applied as the dependent variable. According to the second hypothesis, the share of private
providers is to be tested as an explanatory variable. However, it is not clear whether the degree
of the share is so important. After all, the share is only the result of competition, and it may be
sufficient just to consider the possibility of competition, or ￿contestability￿ in an economic
term.
The model should also consider the influence of municipal political ideology. Since the
political variable is expected to modify the effect of marketization rather than to affect the cost
performance directly, it is included in the model as a modifier of the coefficient of the
marketization variable rather than an independent explanatory variable.
Besides those variables, four other variables are included in the model as the control
variables. The first is the supply-demand balance, expressed as the ratio of the elderly
population to the number of the caretakers, which is also applied to Model 1. The idea is that the
cost is higher when there is more demand than supply. The second control variable is the
number of caretakers. Since the elderly care requires various assets that can be shared by many
caretakers such as furniture (even if the cost for real estate is excluded from the unit cost in the
above), economy of scale has significant effect. Therefore the unit cost should be correlated
negatively with this variable. The third control variable is the population density. This variable
is included because there is no index to indicate the price level of municipalities directly. Here it
is assumed that the cost is higher in the municipalities with higher population density. Finally,
the general attitude of municipalities toward financial expenditure, expressed as the cost for
municipal service per resident, is incorporated. The attitude of municipalities in this aspect16
varies across different municipalities reflecting political, economic, geographical and historical
backgrounds, and the cost for elderly care may well reflect it. To summarize, the analytical
model is specified as follows:
UELDCOST = a1 + {a2  + a3 (BGSHARE)} (PVSHARE) + a4 (CARERATIO)
+ a5 (CARENUM) + a6 (POPDEN) + a7 (GEXP) + error terms (2a)
UELDCOST = a1 + {a2  + a3 (BGSHARE)} (PVDUMMY) + a4 (CARERATIO)
+ a5 (CARENUM) + a6 (POPDEN) + a7 (GEXP) + error terms (2b)
UELDCOST = the cost per caretaker for the care of the elderly in special housing
accommodations (converted to the natural logarithm)
BGSHARE  = the share of politicians of the bourgeois parties (Moderate Party, Centre
Party, Liberal Party and Christian Democrats) in the municipality council
PVSHARE  = the share of the residents of privately managed accommodations in the
total number of caretakers
PVDUMMY = 1 where there is any resident of privately managed accommodations; 0
otherwise
CARERATIO = the ratio of the elderly population to the number of the caretakers = the
number of elderly people per a place in special housing accommodation
CARENUM = the number of the caretakers in special housing accommodation
(converted to the natural logarithm)
POPDEN = population density
GEXP = the total cost for municipal service per resident as an index of the
municipal attitude toward general financial expenditure (converted to the
natural logarithm)17
The data of UELDCOST are not available for 23 municipalities for the year 2001. However,
it is available for the year 2000 in 14 out of the 23 municipalities. Since the sample size is rather
small, it seems to be better to add those 14 samples to the latest samples. There is certainly a
risk of mixing the data of two different years, but the risk may not be so large given the stability
of political and socio-economic conditions from 2000 to 2001. The number of the samples in
this analysis is 280, as a result.
The unit care cost (UELDCOST) is converted to natural logarithm, on the assumption that
the explanatory variables contribute to the care cost multiplicatively rather than additionally.
The total cost for municipal service per resident, GEXP, is also converted to natural logarithm
accordingly. There are two variations for Model 2, one with the share of the residents of
privately managed accommodations (PVSHARE) and the other with the dummy variable
(PVDUMMY) for the existence of private providers. Public providers may dominate the care
market even if private providers are legally allowed to enter into the market. Nevertheless,
market contestability is here judged to be ineffective in such a case, and the model applies the
dummy variable as such. The result of the estimation is shown in Table 3.



























Adjusted R-Square 0.277 0.278
Number of cases 280 280
Model 2a Model 2b
Note: t-Statistics in parenthesis; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5%
(**) and 1% (***) levels.18
The estimation gives a support to the hypothesis about the effect of marketization. In both
Model 2a and Model 2b, the coefficient of PVSHARE is significantly negative. Interestingly,
the coefficient of the political variable, BGSHARE, is positive, meaning that the bourgeois
ideology offsets the effect of marketization. This implies that the municipalities with strong
bourgeois ideology are, somewhat paradoxically, less concerned about the effect of
marketization, while they are more anxious for the introduction of marketization.
For the control variables, the results are consistent with the prior expectations for all four
variables. In other words, the unit cost is likely to be higher in the municipalities with larger
demand, with smaller number of caretakers, with higher population density and with more
generous public expenditure policy.
5. CONCLUSION
While the marketization of elderly care is a hot political issue with increasing practices, the data
availability is still far from sufficient for close analysis. On top of that, the two hypotheses
presented in this paper only describe the general tendency across municipalities, ignoring any
specific characteristics of every single municipality. The variety of private providers, from large
business corporations to small non-profit organizations, is also neglected. Despite those
deficiencies, it is still meaningful to find whether the hypotheses are applicable as general rules,
for better understanding of the ongoing movement and for better policy prescriptions in the
future. And the above estimations give generally good support to those hypotheses.
Regarding the motives of the municipalities for marketization of elderly care, it is verified
that municipalities with stronger bourgeois ideology, more serious shortage of care supply,
larger size of caretakers and higher population density are more likely to take a positive attitude
toward marketization. As for the effect of marketization, the cost performance is apparently
correlated both with the scale of marketization (i.e. how much is the share of private providers)19
and with the presence of marketization (i.e. whether private providers are present in the market).
Along the history of the marketization of elderly care, there has been a long debate about its
benefit. In that debate, the most popular question is whether private providers can achieve better
performance than municipal providers. The current study does not answer that question, but it
instead demonstrates the usefulness of marketization for the improvement of the overall cost
performance. This is partly because private providers are good at saving costs, but more
importantly because public providers also seem to improve their cost performance, encouraged
by the participation of private providers. The argument here is consistent with the proposition
that ￿public-sector organisations will be more efficient and responsive if they are exposed to
competitive pressures￿ in the literature of the public choice theory (Boyne 1996: 718). While the
skeptics of marketization often stresses that private providers are profit-maximizers, they should
recognize that municipal providers are not really different. It is necessary to give municipal
providers some incentive to improve their cost performance, and market competition seems to
be one of the most effective incentives.
There may well be a concern about the risk of focusing on the cost performance with no
discussion on the qualitative aspect. Since there is no data of qualitative performance commonly
available across municipalities, the qualitative aspect is inevitably put outside the scope of the
current study. However, cost reduction should not automatically be regarded as quality
deterioration by nature. Likewise, high cost does not imply high quality. In order to keep the
quality of services, it is necessary to give strict guidelines and to prepare sufficient budgets, but
those measures can be consistent with the introduction of market competition.
Yet just to introduce market competition does not seem to be enough. The above estimation
has also revealed that the municipal political ideology is significant in that it modifies the effect
of marketization in a negative way. That is, marketization is less effective in municipalities with
strong bourgeois ideology, presumably because those municipalities often make marketization
an objective by itself, rather than a means to achieve better cost performance. It is therefore20
important to take some measures to avoid such ￿political noise￿.
A way to avoid political bias while preserving the benefit of marketization may be to transfer
the authority to choose providers from municipalities to individual caretakers, which is
generally called the kundval (￿customer-choice￿ in English), or voucher, system. In this system,
caregivers should compete, but without taking account of the political preference of
municipalities. Indeed, a number of municipalities have already introduced this system in
various policy fields (see Svenska Kommunf￿rbundet 2001b, for example). It would be
interesting to examine the effect of the system, but that is beyond the purpose of the current
study.21
APPENDIX 1: Basic statistics of the variables in Model 1
Variable Cases Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
PRVSHARE 289 0.055 0.118 0 0.654
BGSHARE 289 0.441 0.124 0.086 0.867
BGDUMMY 289 0.318 0.467 0 1
CARERATIO 289 13.41 2.879 6.782 25.32
CARENUM* 289 5.559 0.823 3.367 9.345
POPDEN 289 126.1 417.5 0.256 4,031
ELDSHARE 289 0.189 0.039 0.064 0.297
Variable Cases Cases 0 Cases 1
BGDUMMY 289 197 92
APPENDIX 2: Basic statistics of the variables in Model 2
Variable Cases Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
UELDCOST* 280 12.78 0.180 12.18 13.28
BGSHARE 280 0.442 0.123 0.097 0.867
PVSHARE 280 0.057 0.120 0 0.654
PVSHARE￿BGSHA 280 0.030 0.071 0 0.567
PVDUMMY 280 0.457 0.499 0 1
PVDUMMY￿BGSHA 280 0.219 0.251 0 0.867
CARERATIO 280 13.36 2.873 6.782 25.32
CARENUM* 280 5.575 0.820 3.367 9.345
POPDEN 280 129.4 423.7 0.256 4,031
GEXP* 280 10.59 0.125 10.27 10.97
Variable Cases Cases 0 Cases 1
PVDUMMY 280 152 12822
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